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Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk - 2013

We consider the design of an optimal auction in which the seller can determine the allocation and the disclosure rule … sequential disclosure rule, implemented in an ascending price auction. In the optimal disclosure mechanism, each losing bidder … learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder only learns that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079579

Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and … the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing … bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder's information is truncated from below. As the auction ends, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045254

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over valuations, we characterize the set of possible outcomes that can arise in a Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350

Aggregation of Diverse Information with Double Auction Trading among Minimally-Intelligent Algorithmic Agents

Jamal, Karim - 2019

expectations equilibrium) in a competitive double auction market? An apparent ex-ante answer is: intelligent enough to perform the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868557

Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - 2012

correlation among the d parameters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170574

Selling to Intermediaries : Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

We characterize revenue maximizing auctions when the bidders are intermediaries who wish to resell the good. The bidders have differential information about their common resale opportunities: each bidder privately observes an independent draw of a resale opportunity, and the highest signal is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949875

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Bergemann, Dirk - 2018

We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English …-price, and English auctions all have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to that of the first-price auction as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012918269