We reconsider an important debate between Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) nominally about congestible roads. Contrary to Knight's contention, allowing independent players to set tolls on congestible roads does not necessarily induce an efficient allocation of motorists. Toll- setting does result...

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an elementary introduction to the nonrenewable resource model with multiple demand curves. The theoretical literature following Hotelling (1931) assumed that all energy needs are satisfied by one type of resource (e.g. “oil"), extractible at different...

Individuals extracting common-pool resources in the field sometimes form output-sharing groups to avoid costs of crowding. In theory, if the right number of groups forms, Nash equilibrium aggregate effort should fall to the socially optimal level. Whether individuals manage to form the efficient...

Efforts to limit cumulative emissions over the next century may be partially thwarted by the responses of fossil fuel suppliers. Current price-cost margins for major reserves are ample, leaving scope for significant price reductions if climate policies reduce demand for fossil fuels through...

The forestry literature has sought to describe competitive equilibria by first solving social planning problems. This "indirect" approach may cease to be useful in determining market equilibrium if the government intervenes. The equilibrium price path of timber is characterized directly here...

Price collars have frequently been advocated to restrict the price of emissions permits. Consequently, collars were incorporated in the three bills languishing in Congress as well as in California?'s AB-32; Europeans are now considering price collars for EU ETS. In advocating collars, most...

Previous analyses of cap-and-trade programs regulating carbon emissions assumed that firms must surrender permits as they pollute. If so, then the price of permits may remain constant over measurable intervals if the government injects additional permits at a ceiling price or may even collapse...

When every individual's effort imposes negative externalities, self-interested behavior leads to socially excessive effort. To curb these excesses when effort cannot be monitored, competing output-sharing partnerships can form. With the right-sized groups, aggregate effort falls to the socially...

Common intuition and experimental psychology suggest that the ability to self-regulate ("willpower") is a depletable resource. We investigate the behavior of an agent with limited willpower who optimally consumes over time an endowment of a tempting and storable consumption good or "cake". We...

Over the past 65 years, forest tenure in China has oscillated unpredictably between private and common property regimes. This policy-induced uncertainty has distorted the harvesting decisions of individuals granted rights to grow trees and has lowered the value of China’s forest output. We...