We consider a cross-calibration test of predictions by multiple potential experts in a stochastic environment. This test checks whether each expert is calibrated conditional on the predictions made by other experts. We show that this test is good in the sense that a true expert-one informed of...

We study a one-sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer's valuation. We show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of outcomes....

We show that in a class of I‐agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple disclosure game between the...

This paper develops a decision-theoretic approach to normal-form refinements of Nash equilibrium and provides characterizations of (normal-form) perfect equilibrium and proper equilibrium. The approach relies on a theory of single-person decision-making that is a non-Archimedean version of...

Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a weaker form than is...

An important application of the theory of choice under uncertainty is to asset markets, and an important property in these markets is a preference for portfolio diversification. If an investor is an expected utility maximizer, then he is risk averse if, and only if, he exhibits a preference for...