Bidding is studied in first-price common value auctions where an insider is better informed than other bidders (outsiders). As in symmetric information structure (SIS) auctions, inexperienced outsiders suffer from a strong winner's curse. Super-experienced bidders, who have largely overcome the...

We use a second-price common-value auction, called the maximal game, to experimentally study whether the winner's curse (WC) can be explained by models which retain best-response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs. We compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game, where the...

In affiliated private value auctions, each bidder has perfect information regarding own value for the object at auction, but higher values of the item for one bid der make higher values for rivals more likely. The authors report on a series of experiments examining the following predictions: (1)...

We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding...

Alternating-offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs, as well as in the role of the order of play. The experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the...