Evolutionary games are introduced as models for repeated anonymous strategic interaction: actions (or behaviors) which are more "fit," given the current distribution of behaviors, tend over time to displace less fit behaviors. Cone fields characterize the continuous-time processes compatible...

This paper reports a laboratory experiment that examines price formation in the single call market. The experiment design is intended to enhance the predictive power of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) theory for this trading institution. The data support several qualitative implications of...

This paper develops a nonparametric theory of preferences over one's own and others' monetary payoffs. We introduce "more altruistic than" (MAT), a partial ordering over such preferences, and interpret it with known parametric models. We also introduce and illustrate "more generous than" (MGT),...

Equilibrium predictions of the noisy rational expectations model are relatively accurate for laboratory asset and information markets. When information about an asset's uncertain dividend is sold to a fixed number of highest bidders, prices, allocations, efficiency, and a distribution of profit...

The study explores the information aggregation properties of experimental markets. A fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium exists in the competitive model of each of the markets studied. For markets with a single compound security in which traders have identical preferences, the...

The authors design and study an OLG experimental economy where the government finances a fixed real deficit through seigniorage. The economy has continua of nonstationary rational expectations equilibria and two stationary rational expectations equilibria. The authors do not observe...