This note provides a generalization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) on multi-choice games. Also, we extend to the multi-choice games case the complement reduced game and characterize the extended EANSC by means of related property of consistency.

Here we propose a weighted extension of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC). Further, an axiomatization is also proposed by applying consistency.

Different from the works of Hwang (2007), we provide two extensions of the reduced games introduced by Moulin (1985) and Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1998) on fuzzy non-transferable-utility (NTU) games, respectively. Based on the reduced games, we provide an axiomatization of the core and...

Inspired by Maschler and Owen (1989), we provide a dynamic approache to the multi-choice Shapley value proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992,1993) under plurality-efficiency.

Different from the works of Hwang (2007), we provide two extensions of the reduced games introduced by Moulin (1985) and Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1998) on fuzzy non-transferable-utility (NTU) games, respectively. Based on the reduced games, we provide an axiomatization of the core and...

In the framework of interval transferable-utility (TU) games, we introduce a generalization of the equal allocation of nonseparable cost (EANSC). Further, we extend the reduced game introduced by Moulin (1985) to interval TU games. By applying this extended reduction, two axiomatizations of this...

Inspired by Maschler and Owen (1989), we provide a dynamic approache to the multi-choice Shapley value proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992,1993) under plurality-efficiency.

In this note we link the solutions for multi-choice games proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992), Derks and Peters (1993), and Peters and Zank (2005) with the Shapley values of some particular TU games.

This note provides a generalization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) on multi-choice games. Also, we extend to the multi-choice games case the complement reduced game and characterize the extended EANSC by means of related property of consistency.

In this note we show that on the domain of fuzzy NTU games whose core is non-empty, the core is the only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality and the reduced game property.