In this paper we reconsider the completely crowding-out effect in a model of the private provision of public goods with non-linear technology for government contributions. Even though there are no free-riders, government contributions financed by lump-sum taxes crowd out private contributions...

In this paper we reconsider the completely crowding-out effect in a model of the private provision of public goods with non-linear technology for government contributions. Even though there are no free-riders, government contributions financed by lump-sum taxes crowd out private contributions...

This paper constructs an entry and code-sharing alliances game to demonstrate that the alliance between the incumbent carriers may play a significant role of entry deterrence in a given airline network. We show that incumbents can use the alliances as a credible threat to deter the entry of the...

This note studies the cost-reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market. The result shows that while a profit-maximizing private firm carries out the cost-reducing investment, a social welfare-maximizing firm does not have an incentive to reduce its costs as long as the market share of the...

This paper constructs an entry and code-sharing alliances game to demonstrate that the alliance between the incumbent carriers may play a significant role of entry deterrence in a given airline network. We show that incumbents can use the alliances as a credible threat to deter the entry of the...

This note studies the cost-reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market. The result shows that while a profit-maximizing private firm carries out the cost-reducing investment, a social welfare-maximizing firm does not have an incentive to reduce its costs as long as the market share of the...