Showing 1 - 10 of 48
cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407616
. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062371
effect, the core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are monotonic and players' preferences over public goods have … connected support. All core allocations consist of connected coalitions and they are Tiebout equilibria as well. We also examine …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550914
does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550950
apply them in the characterization of two solution concepts. One is Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and the other is a … subsolution of it which we call the Coarse+ Core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118523
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118590
invoke here is the core. We also show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing … due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeilds outcomes for a generalized marriage problem, which necessarily belong to the core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118618
members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The … internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core is introduced, that requires …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118634
We propose a new geometric approach for the analysis of cooperative games. A cooperative game is viewed as a real valued function $u$ defined on a finite set of points in the unit simplex. We define the \emph{concavification} of $u$ on the simplex as the minimal concave function on the simplex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118576
It is well known since Owen (Management Science, 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407525