We investigate to what extent genuine social preferences can explain observed other-regarding behavior. In a dictator game variant subjects can choose whether to learn about the consequences of their choice for the receiver. We find that a majority of subjects showing other-regarding behavior...

We study the determinants of borrowers' default in P2P lending with a new data set consisting of 70,673 loan observations from the Lending Club. Previous research identified a number of default determining variables but did not distinguish between different loan risk levels. We define four loan...

We investigate to what extent genuine social preferences can explain observed other-regarding behavior. In a dictator game variant subjects can choose whether to learn about the consequences of their choice for the receiver. We find that a majority of subjects showing other-regarding behavior...

We investigate to what extent genuine social preferences can explain observed other-regarding behavior. In a dictator game variant subjects can choose whether to learn about the consequences of their choice for the receiver. We find that a majority of subjects showing other-regarding behavior...

We study the determinants of borrowers’ default in P2P lending with a new data set consisting of 70,673 loan observations from the Lending Club. Previous research identified a number of default determining variables but did not distinguish between different loan risk levels. We define four...

We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either...

We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either...

In two-person generosity games, the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...

We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and...

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as 'given.' A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading to...