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Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment

Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco; Bigoni, Maria - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 570-586

We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisonerʼs dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049838

Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust

McEvily, Bill; Radzevick, Joseph R.; Weber, Roberto A. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 285-298

We advance the measurement of trust in economics in two ways. First, we highlight the importance of clearly identifying … the target of trust, particularly for obtaining concordance between attitudinal and behavioral measures of trust. Second …, we introduce a novel behavioral measure of (dis)trust, based on individualsʼ willingness to pay to avoid being vulnerable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049788

Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

Drouvelis, Michalis; Saporiti, Alejandro; Vriend, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 86-115

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049886

Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets

Wright, Julian - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 91-102

An experiment is designed to provide a snapshot of the strategies used by players in a repeated price competition game with a random continuation rule. One hundred pairs of subjects played the game over the Internet, with subjects having a few days to make their decisions in each round....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049890

Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Koch, Alexander K.; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 122-135

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931200

Political Motivations and Electoral Competition : Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence

Drouvelis, Michalis - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012933425

Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 339-353

consistency, independence of the original partition of deviating players, and coherence of expectations. Exogenous rules are the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117136

Fair by design: Multidimensional envy-free mechanisms

Mu'alem, Ahuva - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 29-46

We address the common scenario where a group of agents wants to divide a set of items fairly, and at the same time seeks to optimize a global goal. Suppose that each item is a task and we want to find an allocation that minimizes the completion time of the last task in an envy-free manner, where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117143

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Weerdt, Mathijs M. de; Harrenstein, Paul; Conitzer, Vincent - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 405-420

A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785192

Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies

Tsakas, Elias - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 126-144

In this paper, we introduce a notion of epistemic equivalence between hierarchies of conditional beliefs and hierarchies of lexicographic beliefs, thus extending the standard equivalence results of Halpern (2010) and Brandenburger et al. (2007) to an interactive setting, and we show that there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785196