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Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 174-189

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117135

Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 24-44

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738052

Voronoi languages

Jäger, Gerhard; Metzger, Lars P.; Riedel, Frank - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 517-537

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049703

Dynamic coordination with individual learning

Dasgupta, Amil; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 83-101

We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest … tolerant of non-simultaneous coordination. We also identify conditions under which players coordinate on the risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049831

The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study

Brindisi, Francesco; Çelen, Boğaçhan; Hyndman, Kyle - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 264-281

This paper investigates the role of endogenous timing of decisions on coordination under asymmetric information. In the … equilibrium of a global coordination game, where players choose the timing of their decision, a player who has sufficiently high … coordination: a learning effect (early decisions reveal information) and a complementarity effect (early decisions eliminate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049850

Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis

Battaglini, Marco; Makarov, Uliana - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 147-164

We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of conflict between the senderʼs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049867

Harmful signaling in matching markets

Kushnir, Alexey - In: Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013) C, pp. 209-218

information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. In particular, we consider a two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049896

Communication in bargaining over decision rights

Lim, Wooyoung - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 159-179

This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. We introduce two different bargaining mechanisms: tacit and explicit bargaining. In tacit bargaining, an uninformed principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906690

Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information

McGee, Andrew; Yang, Huanxing - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 181-191

This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information simultaneously communicate with an uninformed receiver. The sensitivity of the receiverʼs ideal action to one senderʼs private information depends on the other senderʼs private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049841

Level-k reasoning in a generalized beauty contest

Shapiro, Dmitry; Shi, Xianwen; Zillante, Artie - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 308-329

two dimensions: the strength of the coordination motive and the information symmetry. We use a variation of the Morris and … information and a strong coordination motive. Their predictive power weakens significantly when either private information is … introduced or the importance of the coordination motive is decreased. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785207