. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N … and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria …

men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second …-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the …

An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of … general PSCs with nontrivial profit sharing than in an auction with only a one-time payment. …

payment rule coincides with the payment rule of the Vickrey Auction. …

/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from … simple yet mildly inefficient buyer's bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism. …

We study a sealed-bid auction between two bidders with asymmetric independent private values. The two bidders own … and show that they are closely related to equilibrium strategies of two well-studied mechanisms: the double auction … between a buyer and a seller and the first-price auction between two buyers (or two sellers). Combining results from those two …