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This paper studies the design of couples’ income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses’ utilities; bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple. Information structure and labor supply decisions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189074
This paper analyzes the regulation of payment schemes for health care providers competing in both quality and product differentiation of their services. The regulator uses two instruments: a prospective payment per patient and a cost reimbursement rate. When the regulator can only use a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636014
This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of different remunerations schemes on the physicians’ side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009274530
We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene…fit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size...
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This paper studies how the risk of divorce a¤ects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011158977
We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents di§er in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240552