Sharp nonparametric bounds are derived for Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. These 'i-bounds' generalize earlier results of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008). We show that their e-bounds are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). They do not require...

Sharp nonparametric bounds are derived for Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. These 'i-bounds' generalize earlier results of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008). We show that their e-bounds are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). They do not require...

We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. Stability means that the marriage matching is individually...

In this paper, we develop a revealed preference methodology that allows us to explore whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of individual preference nonstationarities or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit. An empirical...

In this paper, we develop a revealed preference methodology that allows us to explore whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of individual preference nonstationarities or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit. An empirical...

To analyze the impact of changes in the value of marriage on household decisions, we present a limited commitment framework of household behavior in which decisions are made regarding labor supply, divorce and housing demand over the lifecycle. We identify and estimate our structural model using...

We created a unique data set based on social media data by collecting and geo-localising all the tweets of 54 thousand Swedish citizens from January 2019 to June 2019. This allows us to construct an attractive individual-level measure of preferences for pro-environmental behavior. We demonstrate...

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to di¤erent public...

We extend the collective model of household behavior to allow for the existence of public consumption. Under a separability assumption, we show that the observation of the labor supplies and the household demand for the public good allow to identify preferences and the decision process up to...

The extent to which like-with like marry is particularly important for inequality as well as for the outcomes of children that result from the union. In this paper we discuss approaches to the measurement of changes in assortative mating. We derive two key conditions that a well-defined measure...