This paper links the current sub-prime mortgage crisis to a decline in lending standards associated with the rapid expansion of this market. We show that lending standards declined more in areas that experienced larger credit booms and house price increases. We also find that the underlying...

In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible....

This paper links the current sub-prime mortgage crisis to a decline in lending standards associated with the rapid expansion of this market. We show that lending standards declined more in areas that experienced larger credit booms and house price increases. We also find that the underlying...

We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the...

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE -- III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE -- IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER -- V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS -- REFERENCES.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. A MODEL OF GLOBALIZATION HAZARD AND PRICE GUARANTEES -- III. CHARACTERIZING THE GLOBALIZATION HAZARD-MORAL HAZARD TRADEOFF -- IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS -- V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES.

To date, an operational measure of systemic risk capturing non-linear tail comovement between system-wide and individual bank returns has not yet been developed. This paper proposes an extension of the so-called CoVaR measure that captures the asymmetric response of the banking system to...

We investigate the complex interactions between credit constraints, political instability, and capital accumulation using a novel approach based on Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) theoretical framework. Drawing on a unique firm-level data set from Middle-East and North Africa (MENA),...

We study the effects of a bank's engagement in trading. Traditional banking is relationship-based: not scalable, long-term oriented, with high implicit capital, and low risk (thanks to the law of large numbers). Trading is transactions-based: scalable, shortterm, capital constrained, and with...

This paper studies the impact of bank regulation and taxation in a dynamic model with banks exposed to credit and liquidity risk. We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between capital requirements and bank lending, efficiency, and welfare, with their benefits turning into costs beyond a...