This paper studies the impact of expenditure conditionality in IMF programs on the composition of public spending. A granular dataset on different government expenditure conditions covering 115 countries for the 1992-2016 period is compiled. The results support the view that while conditionality...

This paper investigates the role that International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs and capacity building play in fostering structural reforms. To do so, we exploit two novel datasets on IMF capacity building and structural reforms available for over one hundred IMF member countries over the period...

This gap-filling paper provides granular advice on how to design quantitative and structural conditionality of IMF-supported programs in six expenditure policy areas: social assistance, energy subsidies, pension spending, health spending, education spending, and wage bill management. Such...

This paper examines the effects of IMF financial assistance on economic governance in developing countries, based on panel data analyses of perceived governance indicators. It uses a two-stage approach to address possible endogeneity issues. The results show that successful implementation of IMF...

We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the...

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. SOME PRINCIPLES FOR ASSESSING THE DESIGN OF FISCAL CONDITIONALITY -- III. MACROECONOMIC THRESHOLDS AND PCS Inflation -- IV. OTHER ASPECTS OF QUANTITATIVE FISCAL CONDITIONALITY DESIGN -- V. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE LITERATURE -- III. STYLIZED FACTS OF IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS -- IV. DETERMINANTS OF PRIOR ACTIONS -- V. PRIOR ACTIONS AND PROGRAM SUCCESS -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- References -- Appendix.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE -- III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE -- IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER -- V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS -- REFERENCES.