In a new model of work schedules, employers choose the number of working hours and either dictate the exact hours to be worked or delegate that decision to workers via flextime. Workers' preferences over schedules influence their productivities. An inverted-U-shaped hours-output profile arises;...

We empirically test whether executives' increases in base salary when promoted to CEO result from the wage bids of competing firms (i.e., "market-based tournaments") or from the strategic choices of the firm's board of directors to elicit optimal executive incentives (i.e., "classic...

Research Question/ Issue: Do large, within-firm executive pay differences hurt firm performance? Prior literature shows mixed results concerning the sign of the relationship between executive pay disparity and firm performance. This study evaluates that literature, clarifies what tournament...

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...