<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>We develop a theoretical model of the firm that links properties (stewardship vs. valuation focus) of financial reporting regimes with the informational properties of optimal managerial accounting systems. We show that, contrary to the standard textbook proposition, properties of...

<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>This paper studies the role of conservative accounting standards in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation. We show that when accounting numbers serve both the valuation role (in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm's...

In this paper we study when it is advantageous to improve corporate transparency by allowing shareholders direct access to corporate information and when it is preferable to rely on a reporting system in which shareholders only gain access to information that management chooses to disclose. We...