This paper proposes a simple analytical model to examine conditions in which a government policy to improve imperfect credit markets is practiced through a democratic political process, and analyzes interactions between the politically implemented policy and economic development. Individuals who...

This paper provides a simple theory to study how the allocation of public funds between primary and higher education affects human capital accumulation. The allocation is endogenously determined through majority voting. Public funding for higher education is not supported when a majority is...

This paper presents a simple model to examine the implication of credit market imperfections when considering the massive variation of agricultural labor productivity across countries. The development of credit markets enables more agents to acquire skills to work in non-agricultural sectors....

We consider an overlapping generations closed economy in which a government finances the cost of public good provision by labor income taxation and/or public debt issuance. The size of these public policies is determined in a repeated probabilistic voting game. We investigate the characteristics...

This paper investigates the effect of inequality on economic growth in nondemocratic regimes. We provide a model where a self-interested ruler chooses an institution that constrains the policy choice of the ruler. The ruler must care about the support share of citizens to keep power. Under an...

We consider an overlapping generations model with public education and social security where the overall size of these policies is determined in a repeated voting game. We investigate the interaction between the politically determined policies and economic development in a Markov perfect...