A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective,...

The ability of firms to reposition their products can determine the effects of demand shocks, mergers and policy interventions in differentiated product markets. This paper estimates a dynamic oligopoly model to measure repositioning costs in the commercial radio industry. Based on a set of...

Commercial radio stations and advertisers have potentially conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This paper estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence...

This paper analyzes the dynamics of prices in two online secondary markets for Major League Baseball tickets. Controlling for ticket quality, prices tend to decline significantly as a game approaches. The paper describes and tests alternative theoretical explanations for why this happens in...

Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends...

We generalize recent models of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing for long-lived strategic buyers, with a single parameter capturing the extent to which each buyer internalizes future buyer surplus. Many of the equilibria that exist when buyers are...

The one-shot nature of most theoretical models of strategic investment, especially those based on asymmetric information, limits our ability to test whether they can fit the data. We develop a dynamic version of the classic Milgrom and Roberts (1982) model of limit pricing, where a monopolist...

We estimate a model of service choice and price competition in airline markets, allowing for the carriers that provide nonstop service to be a selected subset of the carriers competing in the market. Our model can be estimated without an excessive computational burden and we use the estimated...

Governments rescue private companies partly to prevent other firms from gaining excessive market power. However, if failing firms exit, new entry may limit remaining firms' market power if there are potential entrants who can be as effective competitors as the firms leaving the market. We...