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How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210093
information, but differ in two dimensions: the rules governing communication, which determine whether information is verifiable …; and the sender's commitment power, which determines the extent to which she can commit to her communication strategy …. Our design exploits these variations to explicitly test for the role of rules and commitment in communication. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012480348
forecasters, typically have such a supply-side interpretation, as do many firms. New communication strategies could avoid public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481103
information. Can a bargaining environment that facilitates or restricts communication alleviate these costs? We exploit a unique … platform introduced unstructured communication allowing buyers and sellers on the desktop version of the site, but not the …, using text analysis, that the dynamics are consistent with repeat players learning how to use communication in bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482204
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463109