We investigate experimentally whether entry costs have an impact on the evolution of cooperation in a social dilemma game. In particular, subjects repeatedly play the so-called takeover game with anonymous partners randomly drawn from a fixed population of participants. The game represents a...

Die menschliche Art ist eine Spezies, die durch Einsatz von Institutionen undNormensystemen kollektive Güter (oder Übel) bereitzustellen vermag.1 Kollektive Güterbilden typischerweise Antworten auf Kollektivgut-Probleme. Eine besonders wichtige Klassesolcher Kollektivgut-Probleme entsteht im...

Relying on the specific example of ultimatum bargaining experiments this paperexplores the possible role of empirical knowledge of behavioural “norm(ative)facts” within the search for (W)RE – (Wide) Reflective Equilibria on normativeissues. Assuming that “pro-social” behaviour...

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limits imposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Such contribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption, the...

We investigate the intertemporal allocation behavior of spouses with different deterministic life expectations in an experiment. In each period of their life both partners propose a consumption level of which one is then randomly implemented. In spite of the complex dynamics optimal behavior is...

This paper analyses individual information acquisition in an ultimatum game with a-priori unknown outside options. We find that while individual play seems to accord reasonably well with the distribution of empirical behavior, contestants seem to grossly overweigh the value of information. While...

Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are...

This paper focuses on the uneasy alliance of rational choice and evolutionary explanations in modern economics. While direct evolutionary explanations of "optimality" rule out "purposeful" rational choice by assuming zero-intelligence and pure rational choice explanations leave no room for...

We experimentally test overconfidence in investment decisions by offering partic- ipants the possibility to substitute their own for alternative investment choices. Overall, 149 subjects participated in two experiments, one with just one risky as- set, the other with two risky assets....

Medical doctors act as agents of their patients by either treating them directly or referring them to other more or differently specialized doctors, who thereby become "agents of agents". The main aim of this paper is to model central aspects of such two-layered agency relations in the medical...