This essay examines the sensitivity of collective rankings and winners to the weights used in score vectors that are applied to sets of individual rankings to yield collectieve rankings in a typical additive manner. The paper considers probabilities of getting the same winner and the same...

This paper has examined the relationship between social homogeneity measured by σ(p)=p <Subscript>1</Subscript> <Superscript>2</Superscript> + ... + p <Subscript>6</Subscript> <Superscript>2</Superscript> and the likelihood of Condorcet's paradox. Attention was restricted to three-candidate elections. It was shown first that the most general restriction on p vectors that produces a definite...</superscript></subscript></superscript></subscript>

Median Voting Rule (MVR) has been proposed as a voting rule, based on the argument that MVR will be less manipulable than Borda Rule. We find that plurality rule has only a slightly greater probability of manipulability than MVR, and that Copeland Rule has a smaller probability of manipulability...

To what extent are some voting rules more vulnerable to strategic manipulation than others? In order to answer this question, representations are developed for the coalitional manipulability of eight voting rules under various assumptions concerning the likelihood that given voters' preference...