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Conflict Resolution Under Asymmetric Information

Bester, Helmut; Wärneryd, Karl - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1998

agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. We model the default option of outright conflict as a … probabilistic contest. Examples of such contests may be international conflict, litigation, and elections. We show, in particular …, that if the loss of surplus from outright conflict is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423852

Inside vs Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm

Müller, Holger M.; Wärneryd, Karl - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1999

distributional conflict, even if all it does is add another level of conflict. In case managers have to be provided with incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190835

Information in Conflicts

Wärneryd, Karl - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2000

We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of the prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649250

Reputation in team production

Glazer, Amihai; Segendorff, Björn - 2001

leader concerned about his reputation may therefore prefer to work with a person unlikely to do Right. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281196

Reputation in Team Production

Glazer, Amihai; Segendorff, Björn - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2001

leader concerned about his reputation may therefore prefer to work with a person unlikely to do Right. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423886

Rent seeking and organizational structure

Wärneryd, Karl - 2014

A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381246

Trust and truth

Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Lilja, Jannie; … - 2007

In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values (sealed-bid double auction) bargaining game with or without communication. Communication substantially increases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281293

Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test

Dreher, Axel; Fischer, Justina A. V. - 2007

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281348

Political polarization

Dixit, Avinash K.; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2007

Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281383

Influence costs and hierarchy

Inderst, Roman; Müller, Holger M.; Wärneryd, Karl - 2000

In an internal capital market, individual departments may compete for a share of the firm's budget by engaging in wasteful influence activities. We show that firms with more levels of hierarchy may experience lower influence costs than less hierarchical firms, even though the former provide more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281458