We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation whereagents may decide on an action in a 2 x 2- coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only...

This paper presents a unified framework to study the co-evolution of networks and play, using the language of evolutionary game theory. We show by examples that the set-up is rich enough to encompass many recent models discussed by the literature. We completely characterize the invariant...

This paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. A normal form game is played repeatedly in a large society of rational agents. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poison processes. Each agent forms his belief...

We study an experimental market with an endogenous institution. In particular, the information and matching structure of the market is determined by the decisions of the individual traders. We examine the effects of the imposition of exogenous transaction (communication) costs. We find that the...

Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium. The present paper explores the relation of this concept to Nash...

This paper reassesses the impact of in°ation on long-term growth for a panel of 14 EU countries. While previous research focuses on a linear nexus or allows for a piecewise linear relationship with one single threshold, we take account of a more complex relationship. We use a theoretical...