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Inefficient use of competitors' forecasts?

Reslow, André - 2019

observed ineffciency and observed horizon dynamics. Using the same model framework, I also rule out overconfidence as the main …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012271247

Deductible or co-insurance: Which is the better insurance contract under adverse selection?

Breuer, Michael - 2004

form of an insurance contract to impose partial insurance of the low risks. This paper contributes to the discussion on … optimal insurance. It analyzes two basic forms of insurance contracts: A contract with a deductible and a contract imposing a … positive co-insurance rate. Since high risks can always self-reveal themselves as high risks and buy the optimal insurance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315526

Multiple losses, ex-ante moral hazard, and the non-optimality of the standard insurance contract

Breuer, Michael - 2003

Under certain conditions the optimal insurance policy will offer full coverage above a deductible, as Arrow and others … have shown long time ago. Interestingly, the same design of insurance policies applies in case of a single loss and ex …-ante moral hazard. However, many insurance policies provide coverage against a variety of losses and the possibilities for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315575

Weddings with uncertain prospects: Mergers under asymmetric information

Borek, Thomas; Buehler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - 2004

We provide a framework for analyzing bilateral mergers when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms' types. We show that there is always a no-merger equilibrium where firms do not consent to a merger, irrespective of their type. There may also be a cut-off equilibrium if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315502

Mergers under asymmetric information - is there a lemons problem?

Borek, Thomas; Bühler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - 2004

We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model-if any, only low-type firms are traded-is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger profits,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315535

Endogenizing private information: Incentive contracts under learning by doing

Gärtner, Dennis - 2004

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315554

Monopolistic screening under learning by doing

Gärtner, Dennis - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315563

Market experience and willingness to trade: Evidence from repeated markets with symmetric and asymmetric information

Lindsay, Luke - 2011

Many studies have found a gap between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept that is inconsistent with standard theory. There is also evidence that the gap is eroded by experience gained in the laboratory and naturally occurring markets. This paper argues that the gap and the effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316894

Incentives and the Core of an exchange economy: A survey

Forges, Françoise; Minelli, Enrico; Vohra, Rajiv - 2000

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non-emptiness of the core as well as core...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318870

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2002

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890