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Termination fees and contract design in public-private partnerships

Buso, Marco; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2018

We study the effects of granting an exit option that enables the private party to early terminate a PPP project if it turns out to be loss-making. In a continuous time setting with hidden information about stochastic operating profits, we show that a revenue-maximizing government can optimally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925624

Supply contracting under dynamic asymmetric cost informationl

Di Corato, Luca; Moretto, Michele - 2024

We consider a long-term contractual relationship in which a buyer procures a fixed quantity of a product from a supplier and then sells it on the market. The production cost is private information and evolves randomly over time. The solution to this dynamic principal-agent problem involves a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478916

Motivate and select : relational contracts with persistent types

Nikolowa, Radoslawa - 2014

's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics as well as the distribution of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010382180

Mandatory disclosure of managerial contracts in nonprofit organizations

Kopel, Michael; Marini, Marco - 2020

. Contract information is now accessible not only to current and prospective donors, but also to rival nonprofit organizations … competing for donations in the fundraising market. Our aim is to investigate the impact of publicly available contract … information on fundraising competition of nonprofit organizations. We argue that, although such provision makes contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012383902

Optimal afforestation contracts with asymmetric information on private environmental benefits

Anthon, Signe; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark - 2004

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601121

Delegating relational contracts to corruptible intermediarie

Troya-Martinez, Marta; Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686297

Efficient communication in organizations

Vaccari, Federico - 2022

Organizations design their communication structures to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence … activities. An efficient communication protocol grants completeinformation payoffs to all organization members, thereby … strategies before being consulted. Under these assumptions, "public advocacy" is the unique efficient communication protocol …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463790

Dynamic regulation of public franchises with imperfectly correlated demand shocks

Buso, Marco; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2023

In a continuous-time setting, we study the design of a dynamic contract between a government and a private entity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013547855

A theory of firm decline

Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas F.; Di Giannatale, Sonia - 2010 - This version: July 20, 2009

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732070

Eliciting information from a committee

Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2012

who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information … disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009517819