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We examine whether the Level-k' model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions within an individual. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333410
A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into "types", and the planner only wants to elicit the agent's type. We first assume beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a space of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189077
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599472
A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into “types,” and the planner wants only to elicit the agent's type. We first assume that beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012637461
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246638
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010048901
It is known that no public goods mechanism can be Pareto efficient in Nash equilibrium, individually rational (IR), simple (using a one-dimensional message space), and dynamically stable. The Walker mechanism satisfies all but stability, while the Groves-Ledyard mechanism satisfies all but IR....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076519
We design a laboratory experiment to identify whether a preference for randomization defines a stable type across different choice environments. In games and individual decisions, subjects face twenty simultaneous repetitions of the same choice. Subjects can randomize by making different choices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014101545