This paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest. We present a permissive result wherein by using just a single...

This paper incorporates social psychology into implementation theory. Real individuals care not only about their material benefits but also about their social influence in terms of obedience and conformity. Using a continuous time horizon, we demonstrate a method of manipulating the...

We investigate implementation of social choice functions as mappings from states to lotteries under complete information. We assume that for every agent, any pair of distinct states induces distinct preferences. A social choice function is called Condorcet-decisive if it always enforces the...

The study of mechanism design is sometimes criticized, because the designed mechanisms depend on the fine detail of the model specification, and agents' behavior relies on the strong common knowledge assumptions on their rationality and others. Hence, the study of 'detail-free' mechanism design...

This paper reconsiders implementation of social choice functions defined as mapping from states to consequences, where we require the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome at every state. In contrast with the standard models, we construct only mechanisms that are universal, i.e., are free from the...

This paper shows a detail-free idea of multi-object large double auction design in general trading environments, where the auctioneer randomly divides agents into two groups, and agents in each group trade at the market-clearing price vector in the other group. With private values, any dominant...

This paper investigates repeated games with perfect monitoring, where the number of repetition is finite, and the discount factor is far less than unity. Players can make a side payment contract, but their liability is severely limited. The history of play may not necessarily be verifiable. With...

This paper introduces a new concept for full implementation that takes into account agents' preferences for understanding how the "process" works. We assume that the agents have an intrinsic preference for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it does not influence their...

We investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete information and side payments. We show that for generic prior distributions, there exists a direct mechanism associated with the social choice function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual...

We investigate infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. We focus on a class of games where the payoff functions are additively separable and the signal for monitoring a player's action does not depend on the other player's action. Tit-for-tat strategies function very well in...