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The quality of publications, approximated by the containing journal's quality indicator, is often the basis for hire and promotion in academic and research positions. Over the years a handful of ranking methods have been proposed. Discussing the most prominent methods we show that they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572054
A ranking of journals is manipulable if a particular journal's position can be improved by making additional citations to other journals. We introduce a simple ranking method that is not not manipulable and is invariant to citation intensities, journal scaling and article-splitting. The ranking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533305
A ranking of journals is manipulable if a particular journal's position can be improved by making additional citations to other journals. We introduce a simple ranking method that is not manipulable and is invariant to citation intensities, journal scaling and article-splitting. The ranking of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494433
A ranking of journals is manipulable if a particular journal's position can be improved by making additional citations to other journals. We introduce a simple ranking method that is not manipulable and is invariant to citation intensities, journal scaling and article-splitting. The ranking of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008668738
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985844
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The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764538
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, GEB, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103287
Qualified majority voting is used when decisions are made by voters of different sizes. In such situations the voters' influence on decision making is far from obvious; power measures are used for an indication of the decision making ability. Several power measures have been proposed and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029653