We study the initial assignment of ownership of a good. When the good is sold at the market-clearing price, wealthy agents may acquire it instead of poor agents who value it more highly, all else equal. Non-market assignment schemes such as random rationing may allocate the good more efficiently...

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions in which bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence...

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence...

An analysis of the impact of binding budget constraints on the expected revenue generated by sealed-bid and oral auctions, showing that revenue is higher in the former case.

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence...