This paper examines the role of certain fair value accounting (FVA) outcomes in compensation of US bank CEOs. The use of FVA in compensation invites an agency cost - the clawback problem - if cash compensation is based on unrealized profits that may reverse in the future. At the same time FVA...

Standards and conceptual issues -- Fair value and the conceptual framework -- Fair value accounting : a standard setting perspective -- Have the standard setters gone too far, or not far enough, with fair value accounting? -- Shareholder value, financialization and accounting regulation : making...

This paper examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their CEO compensation, and its consequences for risk and performance. We find that banks with short-term investment intensity pay more cash bonus, exhibit higher risk and perform more poorly than banks with longer-term...

The fixed-effects specification is often used in panel datasets as a way of dealing with correlated omitted variables. A review of recent accounting publications reveals that while researchers are generally aware of the need to include fixed-effects in empirical models when using panel datasets...

We provide evidence that distinguishes between competing production cost-based explanations of how to interpret unusually high (or low) audit fees and their expected relation with accounting quality. Abnormally high or low fees are typically proxied by the residuals obtained from fee models....