Competitive behaviors such as outbidding one’s rivals may be countered by therivals’ threat of mutually destructive objections. In an Arrow-Debreu model of productioneconomies with firms privatized by property rights, we model such hinderedcompetitive behaviors as a coalition’s attempt to...

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked dependson the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition’sresources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notionof blocking that takes such...

Competitive behaviors such as outbidding one's rivals may be countered by the rivals' threat of mutually destructive objections. In an Arrow-Debreu model of production economies with firms privatized by property rights, we model such hindered competitive behaviors as a coalition's attempt to...

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on specific rules that allocate authority among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. Based on a notion of stochastic blocking, we extend...

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion of blocking that takes such...

T.W. Schultz (1975) proposed that returns to human capital were highest in economicenvironments where technology, price or production shocks were common and managerial skillsto adapt resource allocations to those shocks were most in need. We hypothesize that variationin returns to human capital...