Electricity market design requires tools that result in a better understanding of incentives of generators and consumers. Chapter 1 and 2 provide tools and applications of these tools to analyze incentive problems in electricity markets.In chapter 1, models of supply function equilibrium (SFE)...

This paper studies the participation and performance of sophisticated versus unsophisticated auction participants in an environment with numerous bidders, uncertainty, and asymmetric information. We examine multi-unit, pay-as-bid, currency auctions conducted by the Central Bank of Venezuela. We...

In auction environments where bidders have pure private values, the Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961) provides a simple mechanism for efficiently allocating homogeneous goods. However, in environments where bidders have interdependent values, the Vickrey auction does not generally yield...

This paper studies the participation and performance of sophisticated versus unsophisticated auction participants in an environment with numerous bidders, uncertainty, and asymmetric information. We examine multi-unit, pay-as-bid, currency auctions conducted by the Central Bank of Venezuela. We...