Since the political collapse of the 90’s, and in particular since the bicameral commission experience of 1997, Italian governments have always tried to face the need for wide constitutional reform. Reductions in the number of deputies and senators have been planned on several occasions. The...

In this paper we analyze the fairness of the 2007 reform proposal concerning the apportionment of the seats between the regions for the Italian Senate. Theory of power indices is used to compare the actual case with the proposed one. Two scenarios are proposed, senators belonging to the same...

In the United States, the president is elected by the Electoral Col- lege (EC) and not directly by individual voters. This can give rise to a so-called referendum paradox in which one candidate receives more popular votes than any other, but this candidate is not elected. The 2000 election is an...

How can we count and list all the Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik index of power configurations for a given number of players? There is no formula in the literature that may give the cardinal of such a set, and moreover, even if this formula had existed, there is no formula which gives the...

In this paper, we compare the five more famous methods of apportionment, the methods of Adams, Dean, Hill, Webster and Jefferson. The criteria used for this comparison is the minimization of a distance between a power vector and a population vector. The power is measured with the well-known...

A classical problem in the power index literature is to design a voting mechanism such as the distribution of power of the different players is equal (or closer) to a pre established target. This tradition is especially popular when considering two tiers voting mechanisms: each player votes in...

In this paper we address the issue of measuring price performance for the Paris residential market. Our main focus is on choosing the appropiate index or indices capable of efficiently capturing capital growth, capital risk, and identifying the main risk factors inherent in this specific...