We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance of S&P 500 (S&P 1500) firms from 1994-2005 (1996-2005). We find that firms in which the CEO holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by up to 16% p.a. after controlling for traditional...

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. Firms in which the CEO voluntarily holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by more than 10% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is most pronounced in firms...

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance of S&P 500 (S&P 1500) firms from 1994-2005 (1996-2005). We find that firms in which the CEO holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by up to 16% p.a. after controlling for traditional...

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. Firms in which the CEO voluntarily holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by more than 10% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is most pronounced in firms...

Viele Top-Manager von Aktiengesellschaften halten freiwillig einen beträchtlichenBestand an Aktien des eigenen Unternehmens. Dies ist eine erstaunlicheBeobachtung, denn eigentlich sollten Manager kein Interesse daran haben, in ihreeigenen Firmen zu investieren. Da bereits ein beträchtlicher...

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. Firms in which the CEO voluntarily holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by more than 10% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is most pronounced in firms...