Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor's presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation...

I examine a policy-making game among countries that must choose both a policy instrument (e.g., a tax or a quota) and its intensity (i.e., the tax rate or the quota level) to price pollution. When countries price pollution non-cooperatively, they not only set the intensity inefficiently, they...

A previous result by Kemnitz (2001) based on AK type endogenous growth model implied that the gains from immigration depends up on the percapita possession of capital stock by immigrant relative to that of the natives’. However, such a framework ignores the incentive labor creates for...

This paper investigates the impact of skilled immigrants on the welfare the host natives. By employing the idea of induced technical change, and the skilled wage premium, this paper tries to link skilled immigration with observed rise in college enrolment, rise in skilled wages, and further...

Inspired by the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, I study a bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge...

A simple dynamic game is used for analyzing international environmental problems and climate agreements. Different countries are, over time, emitting as well as investing in green technology. In this framework, we can analyze the business-as-usual outcome, short vs. long term agreements,...