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Is pay for performance detrimental to innovation?

Ederer, Florian; Manso, Gustavo - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 59 (2013) 7, pp. 1496-1513

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009783653

Incentives for innovation : bankruptcy, corporate governance, and compensation systems

Ederer, Florian; Manso, Gustavo - In: Handbook on law, innovation and growth, (pp. 90-111). 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009161768

Feedback and motivation in dynamic tournaments

Ederer, Florian - In: Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS 19 (2010) 3, pp. 733-769

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655651

Essays in finance and organizations

Manso, Gustavo - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003966612

Motivating innovation

Manso, Gustavo - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 66 (2011) 5, pp. 1823-1860

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376306

Feedback effects of credit ratings

Manso, Gustavo - In: Journal of financial economics 109 (2013) 2, pp. 535-548

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009784165

Creating incentives for innovation

Manso, Gustavo - In: California management review 60 (2017) 1, pp. 18-32

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011868096

Experimentation and the returns to entrepreneurship

Manso, Gustavo - In: The review of financial studies 29 (2016) 9, pp. 2319-2340

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011610912

Deception and Incentives:How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision

Ederer, Florian; Fehr, Ernst - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives.We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the trueperformance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861196

Deception and incentives: how dishonesty undermines effort provision

Ederer, Florian; Fehr, Ernst - 2007

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268559