We introduce ambiguity about the variance of the risky asset's return in the model of Chacko and Viceira (2005) for dynamic consumption and portfolio choice with stochastic variance. We find that, with investors being able to update their portfolio continuously (as a function of the...

We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list....

We investigate the continuity of equilibrium in differential information economies with a finite number of agents. In this setting, agents can make contingent contracts based on events that are commonly observed. With private information modelled as finite partitions of a compact and metrizable...

We study regulation of a bureaucratic provider of a public good in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. By bureaucratic we mean that it values output in itself, and not only profit. Three different financing systems are studied - cost reimbursement, prospective payment, and the...

We generalize the model of Krugman (1991) to allow for asymmetric trade costs between regions and for (asymmetric) trade costs that are internal to the regions. We find that industrial activity, in a region, is enhanced by higher costs of importing and lower costs of exporting (more precisely,...

We give an illustration of hysteresis (path-dependence) in a simple economy. In the presence of multiple possible equilibrium prices, we find that past expectations determine present prices. This phenomenon of path-dependence is robust under perturbations of the economy.

An example is given in which agents agree to disagree, showing that Aumann's (1976) Agreement Theorem does not extend to a countable space of equiprobable states of nature. Even in this unorthodox setting, if the sets of the information partitions are intervals, an agreement theorem holds. A...

We propose the notion of objects of choice as uncertain consumption bundles, extending the formulation of Arrow (1953). Agents sign “contracts for uncertain delivery”, which specify a list of alternative bundles, instead of a single one. This allows us to incorporate uncertainty and...

We study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the...

We determine the optimal contract for the regulation of a bureaucratic firm in the case in which the bureaucratic bias is firm's private information. We find that output is distorted upward when the bureaucratic bias is low, downward when it is high, and equals a reference output when it is...