Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size the evolutionary process can select...

What is the effect of imports on productivity? To answer this question, we estimate a structural model of producers using product-level import data for a panel of Hungarian manufacturing firms from 1992 to 2001. In our model with heterogenous firms, producers choose to import or purchase...

Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size, the evolutionary process can select...

Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected on the long run by the best response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size the evolutionary process can select any...

We estimate a model of importers in Hungarian micro data and conduct counterfactual policy analysis to investigate the effect of imports on productivity. We find that importing all foreign varieties would increase firm productivity by 12 percent, almost two-fifths of which is due to imperfect...

The present paper investigates the portfolio allocation decisions of an investor with infinite horizon when available financial assets differ in their degrees of liquidity. A model with risk neutral agents allows us to endogenously determine the liquidity premium. With risk averse agents, we...

Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size the evolutionary process can select...

We build a model of informal risk-sharing among agents organized in a social network. A connection between individuals serves as collateral that can be used to enforce insurance payments. We characterize incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements for any network structure, and develop two...