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We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Selden (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989) and Quiggin (1982) are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794122
We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Selden [26], Epstein and Zin [9] and Quiggin [24] are well-ordered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753198
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012093819
Cet article examine en détail les allocations d’assurance de second-rang dans une économie soumise à l’antisélection. Partant d’une extension naturelle du modèle classique, nous supposons une perception imparfaite du risque. Nous caractérisons les contraintes qui s’exercent sur la...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008783687
We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Selden [26], Epstein and Zin [9] and Quiggin [24] are well-ordered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008678317
We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Selden (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989) and Quiggin (1982) are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465347
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001487525
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001340350
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462730
We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post take-it-or-leave-it offers involves a severe loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952465