This paper analyses a transboundary pollution problem between two countries and studies the efficiency comparison of uniform versus differentiated abatement standards when there are imperfect transfers between countries. To achieve this goal, we use a negotiation game and the Nash bargaining...

We investigate the relative efficiency of an agreement based on a uniform standard without transfers and one based on differentiated standards with transfers when strictly identical countries deal with transboundary pollution. We especially ask what role fixed cost plays. Two approaches are...

This paper analyses a transboundary pollution problem between two countries and studies the efficiency comparison of uniform versus differentiated abatement standards when there are imperfect transferts between countries. To achieve this goal, we use a negotiation game and the Nash bargaining...

This note proposes an example which contradicts the idea that similar countries will negotiate an agreement on a uniform standard. It shows that strictly identical countries may have an interest in reducing their emissions differently, and not in a uniform way. This result relies on the...

In this paper, we analyze whether the development of a growing economy could be impeded if a binding climate agreement were signed at the international level. Specifically, we study, in the case of a developing country, the initial momentum for development in the presence of binding emission...