We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios may be ineffective in controlling risk-taking. We propose, instead, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentive features of top-management...

Do deposit insurance programs contribute to financial development? Yes, but only if the regulatory environment is sound.Cull, Senbet, and Sorge examine the effect of different design features of deposit insurance on long-run financial development, defined to include the level of financial...

This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of deposit insurance on financial development and stability, broadly defined to include the level of banking activity and the stability of the banking sector. We use a unique dataset capturing a variety of deposit insurance features across...

This paper examines the effect of global diversification on firm value using a dataset of U.S. firms from 1994-2002. We document that global diversification enhances firm value. Specifically, we find Tobin's q, our proxy for firm value increases with foreign sales (measured as a fraction of the...

This paper examines the incentive structure underlying the current features of bank regulation, particularly the role of prompt corrective action, capital requirements and mandatory restrictions on asset choice as primary tools to control risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions. We...

This paper examines the incentive structure underlying the current features of bank regulation, particularly the role of prompt corrective action, capital requirements and mandatory restrictions on asset choice as primary tools to control risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions. We...

This paper surveys the empirical and theoretical literature on the mechanisms of corporate governance. We focus on the internat mechanisms of corporate governance (e.g., arising from conflicts of interests between managers and equityholders, equityholders and creditors, and capital contributors...

This paper examines the incentive structure underlying the current features of bank regulation. We show that capital regulation has limited effectiveness, given the observed high leverage ratios of banks. We propose instead a more direct and effective mechanism of influencing incentives through...

We model the vulnerability of an economy to a financial crisis as arising from the interaction of the degree of economic specialization and the intermediated financing of the investment opportunities. The probability of a financial crisis is shown to increase in the degree of economic...