We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to dene the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satises one form of reduced game consistency.

We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satisfies one form of reduced game consistency.

We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satisfies one form of reduced game consistency.

We provide an alternative interpretation of the Shapley value in TU games as the unique maximizer of expected Nash welfare. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

We investigate experimentally the modification of initial chances to acquire advantaged positions in bargaining problems. In the baseline case players have equal opportunities to acquire the advantaged position. Chances become increasingly unequal across three treatments. We find: (1) The more...