In this paper we propose a simple model for measuring ‘success’ or ‘decisiveness’ in voting situations. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting rule and the voters’ behavior. The voting rule specifies when a proposal is to be accepted or...

In this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule. Assuming complete information, we model a variety of bargaining...

In a recent paper, we provide an interpretation of the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of the 'bargaining power' that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee negotiating in search of consensus. It is assumed that negotiation takes place under the condition that every winning...

This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark game-theoretic models by Bala and Goyal (2000a) – the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model – and includes both as limiting cases. As in both the said models, a link can be initiated...

We provide a model that bridges the gap between the simplest variation of two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Bala and Goyal’s two-way flow model without decay, where links can be unilaterally formed, and a variation of Jackson and Wolinsky’s model based on bilateral...

In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions...