Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implications of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard...

Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implications of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard...

This paper discusses the behavior of some well-known solutions to standard bargaining problems on the basis of solidarity-type axioms. The paper provides alternative axiomatizations of the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions

Two features of Arrow's social choice theory are critically scrutinized. The first feature is the welfarist-consequentialism, which not only bases social judgements about right or wrong actions on the assessment of their consequences, but also assesses consequences in terms of people's welfare...