The analysis of horizontal mergers hinges on a tradeoff between unilateral effects and efficiency gains. We examine the role of uncertainty in this tradeoff. In theory, the attitude towards uncertainty depends on the curvature of the social objective function. On the one hand, adjustment...

We reexamine the mechanism of prospective reimbursement when the regulator does not observe hospitals? cost characteristics, which can depend on exogenous variables and idiosyncratic shocks. In this framework, we formally develop the "reduced-form" of yardstick competition, which allows the...

We adapt the exclusion model of Choné and Linnemer (2014) to reflect the notion that dominant firms are unavoidable trading partners. In particular, we introduce the share of the buyer’s demand that can be addressed by the rival as a new dimension of uncertainty. Nonlinear price-quantity...

We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price-quantity schedules in an Aghion-Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes depending on whether and how the price of the incumbent good is linked to the quantity purchased from the rival...

This article aims at understanding the interplay between pension schemes and tax instruments. The model features extensive labor supply in a stationary environment with overlapping generations and perfect financial markets. Compared with the reference case of a pure taxation economy, we find...

A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing...

A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing...

We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency and its effect on the design of payment and health care quantity. The physician aims to maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution between profit and patient benefit in the physician...

We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency and its effect on the design of payment and health care quantity. The physician aims to maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution between profit and patient benefit in the physician...

Competition agencies have the power to close an antitrust case in return for the commitment to end the alleged infringement. We examine how such a procedure affects deterrence and consumer welfare. We first show that it lowers the deterrent effect of competition policy. However, under asymmetric...