We show that, in markets with indivisibilties (typified by the Shapley-Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness.

This paper studies the job matching market in Kelso and Crawford(1982) with one exception that co-workers may generate utility or disutility in the workplace. We provide a simple idea to show how a great number of sufficient condiions for a nonempty core in the literature can be extended to this...

Consider a society with a finite number of individuals. A coalition structure is a partition of the set of individuals. Each individual has personal preferences over the set of all coalition structures. We study the strategy proof core and von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN&M) solutions. A roommate...

This note showed by means of Knuth's example that some stable matchings may not be obtained by the random order mechanism.

Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong...

This note showed by means of Knuths example that some stable matchings may not be obtained by the random order mechanism.