I study a model in which banks need to borrow to make risky loans whose return is private information known only by the bank who made the loan. To raise funds, banks can either sell assets or pledge them as collateral. I show that collateral contracts arise in equilibrium even though all agents...

This paper proposes a theory which explains why some assets are traded over the counter while others are traded in centralized exchanges. We develop a model in which the equilibrium market structure is driven by the differences in the trading needs of investors. In our model, trade takes place...

I develop an equilibrium model of U.S. money market funds (MMFs) and use it to analyze the effect of recently proposed regulations on the liquidity provided by these funds and their fragility. The model captures some of the key institutional features of MMFs, such as the "breaking the buck"...

Since <link rid="b31">Sandmo (1981)</link>, many articles have analyzed optimal fiscal policies in economies with tax evasion. All share a feature: they assume that the cost of enforcing the tax law is exogenous. However, governments often invest resources to reduce these enforcement costs. In a very simple model, we...

In a simple search model of money, we study a special kind of memory which gives rise to an arrangement resembling a payment network. Specifically, we assume that agents can choose to have access to a central data base which keeps track of payments made and received. We show that multiple...

I analyze how lack of commitment affects the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Ex post, the government trades off the gains from default induced redistribution against the cost of defaulting. Ex ante, the government issues debt of various maturities to raise an exogenous revenue requirement....