We consider a set-up where two governments have either conflicting or matching preferences on the provision of differentiated (local) goods supplied by a common monopoly bureau. We develop a two-stage game. At stage-1, the two governments decide whether or not to merge into a single institution....

We consider a set-up where two governments have either conflicting or matching preferences on the provision of differentiated (local) goods supplied by a common monopoly bureau. We develop a two-stage game. At stage-1, the two governments decide whether or not to merge into a single institution....

We study the role of age, re-election, gender, education, profession, party affiliation, area of election and different electoral systems on the political survival of 7127 members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate, observed from 1946 to 2013. Our results suggest that theories...

The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamics of growth and convergence in Spain for the period 1965-1995. We analyse the evolution of the per capita income distribution across Spanish provinces and estimate the effects on this evolution of factors such as private, human and public capital,...

This paper presents the results of two experiments designed to test violations of Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) within a sample of Italian trade union delegates and leaders. Subjects priced risky and ambiguous prospects in the domain of gains. Risky prospects were based on games of...

The authors explore the incentives for governments to cooperate by expanding expenditure. They have three countries: two are in a monetary union (the EMU). The labour markets of both the EMU countries are unionized and there is involuntary unemployment in equilibrium. The authors explore the...